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Organized fraud and organizing frauds:
Unpacking research on networks and organization
MICHAEL LEVI1
University of Cardiff, UK
Abstract
This article examines the settings for frauds in the context of crime
networks, fraud opportunities and of a victim-centric typology of
fraud. It demonstrates the variety of actors, settings and the variable
need for knowing collaboration between co-offenders in frauds of
different types. It explores what is known about those involved in
the organization of some forms of frauds; how they find both 
co-offenders and victims in face-to-face and remote settings; and
the barriers to growth of the ‘fraud business’. It concludes that the
globalization of crime is part of contingent relationships between
settings, with their rich and varied opportunities (reflecting patterns
of business, consumer and investment activities), the variable
abilities of would-be perpetrators to recognize and act on those
opportunities (the ‘crime scripts’ perspective), and their interactions
with controls (including, but not restricted to, law enforcement).
Constructs of ‘organized crime’ are becoming less obsessed with the
structure of groups than with what people need from the largely
illicit and largely licit worlds before they commit fraud. Although
some frauds are committed by generic transnational ‘organized
crime’ networks, others are merely mobile small groups or
individuals who can transplant techniques wherever they go; and
others still commit very large one-off frauds without a need for 
long-term or any involvement in ‘organized crime’.
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Introduction
The analytical and research literature on fraud is much sparser than that on
organized crime generally or drugs trafficking in particular.2 This partly
reflects its relatively low political valuation as a non-core part of ‘the crime
problem’, which in turn affects research funding. But the relative (in)access-
ibility of fraud networks to outsiders is also a factor, since frauds (and other
crimes) differ in the way that they are open for marketing, and in the inter-
action between the parties. In this article, we examine the settings for
frauds, which both frames and reflects networks, in the context of fraud
opportunities and of a victim-centric typology (Table 1, adapted from Levi
and Burrows, 2008). This demonstrates the variety of actors, settings and
(less clearly) need for collaboration in frauds of different types. In the
process, we explore what is known about those involved in the organiza-
tion of frauds, though the space available (as well as our knowledge) con-
strains the number of fraud types that can be discussed.
Organizing frauds
Two important themes in analysing the extent to which crimes are loosely or
tightly organized are (1) the ease with which willing criminals find the 
co-offenders necessary or helpful for any given set of offences; and (2) the
breaking down of the elements of criminal organization into its component
parts (i.e. what is termed ‘script analysis’3 by Cornish, 1994; Cornish and
Clarke, 2002). These themes also reflect the tension (in this article and more
generally—see Levi, 2007) between writing about the personnel involved in
frauds (the networks) and what it takes to commit frauds (the scripts). It is
helpful to think of the tasks that need to be performed to commit serious
frauds (and other crimes) and the range of places where they need to be and
are performed. (For all the talk about ‘the’ globalization of ‘crime’, some of
these tasks are as easily accomplished at a local or regional level as they are
transnationally, at least in some jurisdictions.) A higher level ‘script analysis’
of crime for gain might look like the following, with more specific frauds
having their own ‘scripts’ and variable necessities to find co-offenders.
When analysing the dynamics of particular crimes and/or criminal careers,
these procedural elements can be broken down further into much more con-
crete steps and the relationships between their criminal participants analysed
(see e.g. Morselli, 2005; Morselli and Roy, 2008 for some advanced empir-
ical efforts). These steps are not necessarily sequential: for example, we may
see a financial crime4 opportunity only when we meet accountants or lawyers
who are able to facilitate it, or we may already have in place all the steps as
part of our ongoing ‘criminal enterprise’. Criminal finance, some or all crim-
inal personnel or the ‘tools of crime’ (from non-transparent companies to
credit cards) may come from or go to another country, constituting ‘trans-
national’ crimes; or else remain within one country, constituting ‘national’
Criminology & Criminal Justice 8(4)390
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Table 1. A typology of fraud by victim category and form of activity
Victim sector Victim sub-sector Examples of fraud
Private Financial Services Cheque fraud
Counterfeit intellectual property and products 
sold as genuine
Counterfeit money
Data-compromise fraud
Embezzlement
Insider dealing/market abuse
Insurance fraud
Lending fraud
Payment card fraud
Procurement fraud
Non-financial services Cheque fraud
Counterfeit intellectual property and products 
sold as genuine
Counterfeit money
Data-compromise fraud
Embezzlement
Gaming fraud
Lending fraud
Payment card fraud
Procurement fraud
Individuals Charity fraud
Consumer fraud
Counterfeit intellectual property and products 
sold as genuine
Counterfeit money
Investment fraud
Pension-type fraud
Public National bodies Benefit fraud
Embezzlement
Procurement fraud
Tax fraud
Local bodies Embezzlement
Frauds on Council taxes
Procurement fraud
International (but Procurement fraud (by national against other—
affecting public) mainly but not always foreign—companies 
to obtain foreign contracts)
EU funds fraud
Note: See Levi and Burrows (2008, Box 1) for a glossary of common fraud types. The coun-
terfeiting of intellectual property counts as fraud only if the vendor represents it as being the
genuine manufacturer’s product (or, arguably, if the purchaser believes it to be genuine).
Otherwise it may be a loss of the manufacturer’s property rights, but no-one is defrauded: the
manufacturer loses principally if the purchaser would have bought the legitimate product at
the price offered for it, but also if there is collateral damage to the product’s reputation.
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crimes.5 In the case of fraud, offenders may start with differential access to
local, national or international resources, but the exploitation of inter-state
and international regulatory and criminal justice asymmetries—e.g. different
levels of enforcement in the states or countries in which the fraudsters oper-
ate—represents a positive advantage for fraud compared with most other
crimes. In this article, I shall seek to combine the scripts with a brief analysis
of the sorts of networks involved in them.
Applying the sort of script found in Box 1, would-be fraudsters have to
find ‘marks’ to target with their schemes,6 and develop techniques for get-
ting them to part with their money voluntarily: the hallmark of fraud. Some
such offences occur (at least in part) face to face; others are done remotely;
while others still may start technologically (with a letter or an e-mail) and
end with some interpersonal contact. Let us take as an example of the lat-
ter ‘419 frauds’, so called after section 419 of the Nigerian criminal code.
There are few e-mail users who have never encountered scam e-mails—
which usually arrive from a yahoo or hotmail address—offering them vast
wealth if only they will help their previously unacquainted banker/relative
Criminology & Criminal Justice 8(4)392
1. See a situation as a ‘financial crime opportunity’
2. Obtain whatever finance is needed for the crime
3. Find people willing and able to offend (if necessary for the crimes
contemplated) and who are controllable and reliable
4. Obtain any equipment/data needed to offend
5. Carry out offences in domestic and/or overseas locations with or
without physical presence in jurisdiction(s). This will usually involve
manipulating—with varied degrees of complexity, technology and
interpersonal communication skills—victims’ perceptions of ‘what is
happening’
6. Minimize immediate enforcement/operational risks. Especially if
planning to repeat frauds, neutralize law enforcement by technical
skill, by corruption, and/or by legal arbitrage, using legal obstacles to
enforcement operations and prosecutions which vary between States
7. Convert, where necessary (e.g. where goods rather than money are
obtained on credit), products of crime into money or other usable
assets
8. Find people and places willing to store proceeds (and perhaps trans-
mit and conceal their origin)
9. Decide which jurisdiction(s) offers the optimal balance between
social/physical comfort and the risk of asset forfeiture/criminal justice
sanctions. Indifference in any one State or sub-state arena may suf-
fice to neutralize an investigation, and staffing inadequacies as well
as corruption may be the cause of official inaction.
Box 1. The process of fraud and other crimes for gain
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of a deceased corrupt dictator put their ‘dormant account’ or ‘unknown to
the authorities but at risk’ money into their own account for 25–40 per cent
of the ‘take’ (usually $25 billion). Some data can be harvested for ‘identity
fraud’ but the victim is often persuaded to pay ‘advance fees’ to remove
blockages in the funds transfers, and may even be lured to Nigeria or some
other country to pay out more. One of the ironies is that Nigerians are
utilizing their stereotype of corruption in order to make the proposition
more plausible to their intended ‘marks’. Such propositions used to be made
by letter (sometimes using counterfeit stamps to reduce operating costs) but
are now more often made by e-mail, which is almost free. By contrast, other
frauds such as lottery scams may have quite elaborate and convincing
paperwork delivered by bulk mail, often from Spain: although the authori-
ties may be able to identify such scam letters prior to delivery, legal prohib-
itions on interference with the mail (plus commercial interests insofar as
they are paid by the distributors) prevent them from stopping distribution
unless the stamps themselves are counterfeit. Such lottery scams (whether
by mail or e-mail) seldom involve interpersonal contact.
We can see from the Box 1 process map (or ‘script’) one important dif-
ference between frauds and most traditional crimes that have victims: at the
time when the offence is committed (which, in contrast with other property
offences, may happen undetected continuously over years), the fraudster
can be but does not normally need to be in the same place or even the same
continent as the victims or their property. However, few frauds need to be
executed on an international basis, and some fraudsters (like gangsters)
have their domestic geographic comfort zones, even to the level of the shops
in which they prefer to use stolen cards and those they avoid (Levi,
2003[p1]). It is quicker for a credit card fraudster or telemarketer to get a
train from London to Paris than from London to Liverpool, and that can
be important when the rate of fraud upon a stolen or counterfeited card is
time-critical. Rising fuel costs notwithstanding, it is easy and relatively
cheap to fly to many parts of the world, even if one is buying the ticket with
a genuine credit card or cash (which may be the proceeds of past crimes).
However in many other cases, speed of action is unimportant because there
is a long elapsed time between the commission of fraud and its detection by
the victim or by a third party: the latter includes American Express, Visa or
MasterCard (for payment card frauds); Dun and Bradstreet or Experian
(for personal and commercial credit frauds); and the UK Financial Services
Authority, Office of Fair Trading and other regulators (for investment
frauds, ‘market abuse’ and consumer scams). Choice of offender or victim
location is determined by other factors (such as the large number of rela-
tively wealthy but still anxious elderly people in Florida or the south-east of
England). In the larger cases, professional intermediaries and bank accounts
are necessary components in presenting a plausible front and in obtaining
and laundering the funds; in others, cash may be wired via money service
bureaux (like Western Union) or by ‘underground banking’ (Passas, 2005)
to foreign or sometimes domestic locations.
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What is different about frauds compared with other crimes? First, as
researchers since Cressey (1955) have shown, most professionals are
already in a position to commit major frauds such as embezzlement by
virtue of their legitimate jobs. (One may add to Cressey’s rather individual-
oriented approach that few finance directors and CEOs will have their
‘instructions to pay’ questioned by subordinates: so they too do not need
active conspirators—merely that the ciphers they have appointed follow
orders.) Second, whether as (i) individuals and/or as (ii) corporate actors,
they are less likely to be suspected as being ‘out of place’—as Felson (2002,
2006) might put it, their camouflage is already there—both as transactors
in the business deal and as movers of illicit funds after the fact. The latter
is connected to the third point, which is that most (but not all) frauds
obtain money in electronic form, and therefore have less need to deposit
and transfer large cash sums, which more readily arouse suspicions among
the ever-larger number of bodies (not just banks and building societies but
also now antique dealers, car dealers, estate agents, and jewellers), who
have a criminal law obligation to report to a Financial Intelligence Unit
(SOCA in the UK) ‘suspicious transactions’.7 The imagery of cash and drugs
trafficking still predominates in the anti-money laundering arena, despite
the expansion of the legal mandate to include all crimes. (See further, Levi
and Reuter 2006, 2008.)
One more point is noteworthy. There is a temptation—especially in work
on ‘organized crime’—to see the stages above as being part of a conscious
plan: a preconceived strategy of deception (thus replicating the process of
‘case construction’ by police and prosecutors when preparing for court).
However this can be a mistake. In The Phantom Capitalists (Levi, 2008a,
originally 1981), I suggested the utility of looking at bankruptcy and other
frauds in terms of a threefold typology:
(1) pre-planned frauds, in which the business scheme is set up from the start as
a way of defrauding victims (businesses, public sector and/or individuals)
(2) intermediate frauds, in which people started out obeying the law but con-
sciously turned to fraud later; and
(3) slippery-slope frauds, in which deceptions spiralled, often in the context of
trying—however absurdly and over-optimistically—to rescue an insolvent
business or set of businesses that in reality had no hope of repaying its
debts in the future.
In short, motivation to defraud can be heterogeneous rather than a sin-
gle phenomenon; and (where physical identification is not an issue) planned
fraudsters have an interest in pretending to be slippery-slopers or honest-
but-unlucky, to minimize the chances of prosecution, conviction and impris-
onment, thus reversing prosecutors’ case constructions. As with Cressey’s
embezzlers, existing business people have comparatively little problem in
organizing funds transfers out of the company and/or bankruptcy fraud
(although the disposal of large amounts of goods very quickly may be
difficult—one may need an apparently legitimate or large scale illegitimate
Criminology & Criminal Justice 8(4)394
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trader to perform a brokerage role in disposal).8 Once people are willing to
risk whatever ethical and social sanctions might be expected,9 the key prac-
tical problem is organizing the escape from criminal sanctions and proceeds
of crime recovery by creditors or state. These measures may involve willing
collaborators and/or innocent third parties, or a combination (including the
coalition of the willing pretending to be innocent and often remaining
unchallenged). People can use corporations or professions as a means to
attain fraudulent ends, and can do so either at the start (pre-planned fraud)
or as an afterthought in a changed situation. The corporations can be sub-
stantive and real or mere fronts or shells for the perpetration of fraud. But
people can also commit frauds against companies and the government as
outsiders or from more junior positions. An example follows:
Jagmeet Channa, a charity volunteer from a middle-class family and with no
previous criminal convictions, who had been employed at HSBC headquar-
ters first on a short term contract 10 months earlier, was sentenced to nine
years in prison for attempting to steal £72 million from HSBC in April 2008.
One Friday, Channa authorized two seemingly straightforward transactions
in transfers to accounts at Barclays in Manchester and Société Générale in
Casablanca, using passwords stolen from colleagues. Transcripts of tele-
phone calls made from his HSBC landline that evening reveal a series of calls
informing several people that the fraud was a triumph. Attempts to uncover
their identities proved fruitless because they were using pay-as-you-go hand-
sets, which were not already being monitored. Just after lunchtime on the
Sunday, Channa’s plan fell apart. Banking security officials in Malaysia had
noted a double transaction, prompting ‘cause for concern’. Channa had used
a global financial holding account where vast amounts are paid in and then
removed. At the close of daily trading, the account should register zero, but
Channa had inexplicably forgotten to change it and his holding account was
showing a massive debt. It was an elementary error that, if Channa had
avoided it, might have allowed him to pull off his record-breaking crime.10
Channa’s decision to execute the crime on a Friday had compounded his mis-
take. With trading frozen over weekends, security officials find it much eas-
ier to detect anomalies. Had Channa committed the fraud during the
working week, his scam might have remained undetected for long enough to
allow his partners to empty the £72m from the accounts in Manchester and
Morocco. The £72m was frozen and returned to HSBC.
(Summarized from The Observer and other UK newspapers 13 July 2008
and from the author’s interviews with bankers 2008.)
It is not currently known whether Channa was ‘planted’ at HSBC or was
targeted by others after his arrival, but—were it not for the evidence of his
phone calls to conspirators—it might have been possible for him to carry
out all these things alone or with one or two conspirators rather than as a
component of an ongoing ‘organized crime group’. As I write, the other
crime involvements—if any—of the other parties are unknown. (The sort of
analysis conducted by Morselli and Roy, 2008, depends on long-term 
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surveillance of the networks of people already suspected of serious crime.)
This emphasizes the point that fraud permits a variety of offender organ-
izational permutations.
As for the persistence of crime techniques over time, those businesses
that during the 1960s and 1970s deceived their creditors, on the basis that
they needed larger orders to supply their expanding ‘mail order’ trade,
would now do the same on the basis that they have a booming internet-
based sales business, especially prior to Christmas (Levi, 2008a). In the era
of the credit card, dishonest merchants might pass large quantities of
(i) fake or (ii) genuine (but on stolen card) transactions through their com-
mercial accounts, claim (as is normal with traders) advance reimbursement
from merchant acquirer card companies, and then disappear before the
card issuer, merchant acquirer or cardholder realizes there has been a fraud
at all.11 Looking more at individual ‘purchasers’ than businesses, payment
cards were rare during the 1970s, but fraudsters can now use credit card
numbers skimmed from unsuspecting cardholders to order hundreds of
computers on the net from different suppliers, have them delivered to ‘drop
addresses’ in the UK or the US, and then forwarded to addresses elsewhere
for resale: all of this before the cardholder or card issuer becomes aware
there is anything wrong. (The limited availability of such ‘drops’ serves as
a brake on the exploitation of these and other ‘identity fraud’ opportun-
ities.) This and other cyberfraud techniques reflect a comparative criminal
advantage arising from the combination of high technological skills and
high motivation because of poor opportunities in their home countries.
There are also large-scale credit card and loan ‘bust outs’ using people’s
own and stolen identities to obtain goods and money.
The illustrations above show that behaviour of victims-to-be and ‘cap-
able guardians’ has to be considered as part of the organization of crime.
Some suppliers of goods on credit simply make assumptions about credit-
worthiness without asking for references (or are satisfied by references from
members of the credit applicant’s family who had no plausible business
dealings with the firm). They may check out the companies on
telephone/trade directories such as yell.com or BT and, if they are there,
may assume the entries reflect genuine trading, not realizing that they too
may have been ‘fixed’. If the fraudsters—as companies or as individuals—
are buying electronic goods, the sales pressures on telecoms and computer
firms are extreme, especially in a global next-day service culture, and the
rewards for salespeople are often based on what they sell, irrespective of
whether or not it is paid for, though some companies do claw back com-
mission on fraudulent sales, which may act as a brake on enthusiasm or
wilful blindness. Creditors in highly competitive industries are reluctant to
share their fraud losses with other firms and are afraid publicity may make
them more attractive to other fraudsters (author interviews with com-
panies): whether the latter fear is reasonable is unverified. Sharing informa-
tion anonymously via third parties such as trade reference agencies
represents one route to learning from experience. These third parties might
Criminology & Criminal Justice 8(4)396
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be viewed as ‘capable guardians’, but what they may see or construct out
of their partly automated analytical methods are suspicions of fraud rather
than undisputed crimes they have witnessed.
At the individual level, prior to the 1960s (as now in faith and other close
communities), credit was seen more as a personal trust than as an imper-
sonal risk judgement made by professionals. This is one reason some fraud-
sters target religious affinity groups, because the approach for investment is
then seen as coming from a friend rather than a stranger, where trust norms
may not apply (or not to the same extent). Often today, the granting 
(or refusal) of credit to individuals is driven largely by reports from agencies
such as Experian and Equifax (internationally) and—in the UK—Callcredit.
These reports incorporate large amounts of prior credit behaviour, as well
as county court judgements and bankruptcy/Individual Voluntary
Agreement records. To these are added financial institutions’ proprietary
credit scoring—statistical analysis of aggregate data on past loan experi-
ences (‘goods’ and ‘bads’)—and the ‘risk appetite’ of the lenders, which in
the decade before the ‘credit crunch’ in 2007 was high, due to the relative
cheapness of money and the need to find outlets for funds held on deposit
if they were to make a profit.
The role of criminal justice in the control of first party credit fraud—
where borrowers themselves commit fraud rather than have others steal
their details or their cards—is relatively unimportant. Unless the bad
debtors change their names and evade indirect identification, credit refer-
ence agencies can still incapacitate future credit opportunities, irrespective
of whether people have been convicted, discharged from bankruptcy or
indeed have avoided going ‘bust’. Electronic footprints on individual adults
are quite pervasive (especially in the UK and North America, far less so in
Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe), and attempts to sidestep these controls on
identity thefts and cloning are a key battleground against fraud today. Licit
and illicit migration flows generate particular difficulties and asymmetries
in the validation of credit histories. For example. the birth registers and
other personal identifiers are absent from centralized records in many
African and Asian countries, so cannot readily be checked, and certainly
not electronically. Many of the features of late modernity upon which ‘iden-
tity validation’ rests are not uniformly available.
Fraud networks: between the opportunity and the 
criminal act
Tremblay (1993) argued that the likelihood of crime commission is a func-
tion of co-offender accessibility and suitability, and Felson (2003) stressed
that offender convergence settings ‘help likely co-offenders discover one
another in the context of their routine activities. Such settings provide an
ongoing structure for criminal co-operation, even as participants change.
This makes possible a local process of accomplice regeneration, leading to
Levi––Organized fraud and organizing frauds 397
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sustainable criminal behaviour’. Morselli and Roy (2008) note that both
script analysis and social embeddedness emphasize purposive social action,
but differ inasmuch as the social embeddedness perspective places the social
network as the force driving such action, whereas, following Cornish and
Clarke (2002: 53), the script approach maintains that ‘the shape of criminal
organization emerges from the requirements of crime commission’, the net-
work being only one of these requirements. The evidence does not enable us
to determine whether context or existing networks drive organization.
Morselli and Roy argue (p. 77) that the ‘main objective of a network analy-
sis of crime scripts … should be to untangle how some participants con-
tribute in varying degrees to keeping the inherent channels of a [crime]script
in place’ (see p. 83 in their work for a car ringing ‘script’).
A priori, it would appear that different skill sets and statuses will be
needed for different fraud offences, and the barriers to entry depend on the
starting point of any given individual or network in relation to the practical
opportunity and criminal justice obstacles confronting them.12 In most
countries of the world, a distinction is made between ‘laissez faire’ opportun-
ities to set up and work in commerce13 and some restrictions applied to
people who want to open or work in the financial services sector, largely on
the grounds that the latter can directly steal funds from the public. It is
important to understand such restrictions in a global context rather than the
traditional nation-state perspective of regulation and criminal justice: Nick
Leeson (1997) was refused a licence by the predecessor of the Financial
Services Authority because he had failed to declare to it a county court
judgement against him on a debt; but Barings gave him a job in the far less
controlled atmosphere of Singapore, where—though it is very doubtful he
started out with that intent or with a concrete fraudulent plan—he was able
to conduct trades that brought down the entire bank. One possibility for
‘underworld’ offenders is to obtain co-operation from or to put pressure on
people in respectable positions in order to use them as tools of fraud (see the
Channa example earlier, but also people in much more senior positions).
Once they have committed one offence (or legal act that would be seen as
highly disreputable), they may find blackmail makes exit difficult. Some
frauds can be perpetrated most readily by licensed securities dealers, and
persons who are part of or suspected of being connected to a conventional
‘organized crime group’ would have great difficulty passing the examin-
ations and the ‘fit and proper person’ test for admission. (This would also
require substantial elapsed time to acquire the knowledge, and a longer
‘investment’ than is normal.) Therefore, one port of entry is to ‘do a deal’
with existing brokers, as the younger members of New York Mafia families
did with some Russian American brokers during the 1990s, against the
advice of their elders, who thought it too dangerous to move outside ‘the
family’, whom they could control via ties of mutual obligation (Diih,
2005).14 Such intergenerational tensions are part of the response to declin-
ing market position for traditional ‘organized crime’, eroded as it was by the
undercover infiltration and electronic surveillance, followed by prosecutions
Criminology & Criminal Justice 8(4)398
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under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) legislation.
They chose Russian American brokers because they judged that people of
that background were more likely than others to find an approach from ‘the
Mob’ attractive: an example of the irony that a ‘bad reputation’ can bring in
business opportunities.
To illuminate such issues, we must first consider what sorts of networks
are needed for different offences, and the extent to which their contacts and
skill sets enable them to commit a variety of fraud (and non-fraud offences).
For price-fixing cartels, for example, what is needed is an ability to pose as
a legitimate bidder (which will usually require them to have experience in a
relevant area of business) and trust between ‘repeat players’ that if they
overbid for contracts, the winner this time will overbid later to enable them
to win. This is easier within a homogeneous elite—the ‘good old boys’ 
(a term that originated in the Southern States of the US)—than among com-
parative strangers, but such elites can be transnational businesspeople as
well as locals. (See Harding, 2007, for a contemporary review.) In more
competitive markets, the alternative may be corruption of the contract-
giver, perhaps even at the specification stage where the ‘spec’ can be devised
in order to give one party an inbuilt advantage. Cartels use their own cor-
porate and individual identities for contracts (though not necessarily for the
secret meetings that precede the bids) and would seldom need any false cor-
porate fronts for money laundering purposes since no illicit money changes
hands; but bribe-payers might need some false or genuine trading fronts in
order to channel payments to the corrupt public official or private sector
beneficiary.
Sometimes what is needed for the accomplishment of fraud is compliant
people who do not ask critical questions: this was the case with Nick
Leeson and Barings Bank, where as a leading trader, Leeson was sur-
rounded by Singaporean subordinates and colleagues who were passive and
with British superiors who understood little about trading and were content
to take the results he fed them that fed their own large bonuses (Leeson,
1997). Some corporate fraudsters—such as the late Robert Maxwell and
the chiefs of Enron—appoint staff on much higher than normal market
salaries to ensure their loyalty or wilful blindness when facing alternative
employment on much lower salaries. The circle of conspirators at Enron
was larger, but for the main part, they had bankers and lawyers who con-
structed large numbers of offshore Special Purpose Vehicles, and bright,
well paid staff whose jobs would have been imperilled by asking critical
questions. Rogue trader Jerome Kerviel of French bank Société Générale
may have had an occasional accomplice (as is alleged in 2008), but man-
aged to rack up trading losses of billions in 2007 without the aid of an
‘organized crime group’, taking advantage of weaknesses in supervision
which required the resignation of senior management. All of the above
should be borne in mind when thinking about fraud and organized net-
works: there may be no need for conscious co-conspirators, depending on
the chain of authority within large corporate or governmental settings and
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their competence. What some offenders are able to do is simply deploy the
range of global corporate mechanisms available in a free enterprise society
where there are (perhaps tautologically) insufficient ‘capable guardians’ to
stop them misusing the disguises offered by the corporate form or the
authority and power of a corporate role. Let us take as an example the
career of Robert Vesco (Hertzog, 2003), who died in May 2008, to less than
flattering obituaries around the globe.
Robert Vesco
A high school dropout from Detroit, Vesco lied about his age to get a job
on a car assembly line. In 1965, Vesco hustled control of a small, failing
New Jersey valve-making company in return for a five-year $50,000 IOU.
A year later he swapped its assets for control of a defunct stock market-
listed company he renamed International Controls Corporation, which rose
in the 1960s Wall Street boom. Exploiting heavy borrowing and creative
accounting, Vesco used ICC shares to buy bigger companies. But he had to
keep doing deals to pay interest and boost the share price. By the age of 30,
Mr. Vesco was a millionaire.
He later became involved in a Swiss-based mutual fund company,
Investment Overseas Services (I.O.S.), run by a swindler called Bernie
Cornfeld (Raw et al., 1971). When I.O.S. ran into trouble, Mr. Vesco
offered to rescue the company and was embraced by investors terrified of
losing their savings. He bought I.O.S. in 1970 for less than $5 million, gain-
ing control of an estimated $400 million in funds. The accounting at the
company had been so chaotic that Vesco was able to plunder its holdings at
will. After numerous complaints, the US Securities and Exchange
Commission charged him and others in a civil suit with stealing more than
$224 million. But he had already fled, first to the Bahamas and then to
Costa Rica. There, he established a close friendship with President José
Figueres, ploughing some $11 million into his adopted country, especially
into a company founded by Figueres, who passed a law to guarantee Vesco
would not be extradited. He also befriended a nephew of President Nixon,
and gave $200,000 to the Nixon campaign (which allegedly helped fund the
Watergate burglary) in the hope that the president would help quash the
investigation against him. Eventually, a scandal following one of his high-
tech brainstorms—a factory to make machine guns, which included
President Figueres’s son as a partner—led to his flight to the Bahamas,
where he invested in the then Prime Minister. He was welcomed in Antigua
and Nicaragua, before Cuba finally accepted him for ‘humanitarian’ rea-
sons: of course there was no extradition from there to the US. Vesco even-
tually upset the Castro government with a scheme to produce a wonder
drug that supposedly cured cancer, AIDS, arthritis and even the common
cold. He was jailed for 13 years for defrauding a state-run biotechnology
laboratory run by Fidel Castro’s nephew, Antonio Fraga Castro. If we
examine this remarkable life—and the lives of other transcontinental
fraudsters (Block, 1991; Block and Weaver, 2004)—we can see that the
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tools of Vesco’s trade—and his network—were his charisma, accountants
and lawyers willing to create legal entities to serve his interests (especially
in a period before money-laundering legislation imposed greater due dili-
gence requirements on them), a level of wealth that enabled others to ‘party’
at his expense, and his ability to hone in on corruptible people who could
offer him protection from other governments and creditors pursuing him
through the civil courts.
Enron
In the last year at Enron Global Finance group, managers were sometimes
handed a list of Enron assets and instructed to go out and sell some to the
Special Purpose Vehicles. A manager would pick something, from a plant to
stock to a piece of a start-up company, then discuss the deal with a team of
internal lawyers and auditors. A bank or other investor lent money to the
newly created company to finance the purchase. The new company, in turn,
paid the money to Enron. The use of an intermediary was to make the loan
belong to the new company, not Enron, and thus not to count as a debt on
Enron’s financial statement.
Instead, it counted as income to Enron when the new company passed
on the proceeds.
Less debt and more income assured Enron would keep its high credit rat-
ing (making borrowing cheaper) and would keep the stock price up.
Top graduate school employees told the Houston Chronicle (20 January
2002)[p3] there were many uses for the vehicles they considered legitimate,
such as bringing in outside partners to share the risks of a particular venture:
but there was little question, especially toward the end, that many had no real
‘business purpose’ other than improving financial appearances. Say the asset
was 100 shares of IBM stock. Enron would divide each share into two parts,
one called a ‘control interest’ and one called an ‘economic interest’. Then it
would sell the economic interest to a newly created Special Purpose Vehicle. The
asset was rarely as simple as 100 shares of another company’s stock. So Enron
had to put a value on it. Because there was no real outside buyer, it decided the
price itself and had that number approved by its auditor, Arthur Andersen.
The deal was placed with a bank, insurance company or other major lender,
which put up 97 per cent of the money. Sometimes the promise of Enron stock
would be put up to guarantee the loan, although Enron stockholders were
never told of the risk that their shares could be diluted if such new shares had
to be issued. To qualify as ‘independent’ from Enron for accounting purposes,
a Special Purpose Vehicle had to be owned by someone else. So an outside
entity would be brought in to make the required investment, perhaps a tiny
percentage of the SPV’s total start-up cash, sometimes illicitly lent by Enron
itself. An employee told the Houston Chronicle (20 January 2002):
Enron no longer owned the economic interest in the asset, but it did own
control over it. In the sales contract with the vehicle, Enron promised always
to act in the interest of the SPV. Lawyers and auditors said all this was OK.
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As the asset made money for the SPV—if it did, and many didn’t—it made
principal and interest payments to the lender and issued dividends to the out-
side equity partners, just like in a normal company.
Enron got to report the proceeds of the sale of the asset as earnings. It had
to repay the loan … but the debt didn’t show up on Enron’s financial
statements.
‘Investors don’t like to hear you say, “Oh, I was wrong.” So you start hav-
ing a yard sale to boost CFO (cash flow from operations) and net income,’
the employee said.
As the Enron indictments showed, there were plenty of accountants,
bankers and lawyers as well as some senior management willing to partici-
pate in criminal or marginal operations. But they had nothing to do with
any criminal subcultures as conventionally defined. Likewise, the many
works on the savings and loans ‘failures’ (Black, 2005; Calavita and
Pontell, 1993) and on accounting frauds (Tillman and Indergaard, 2005,
2007a, 2007b), which emphasize—sometimes over-emphasize—elite net-
works rather than socio-economically marginal firms (Shapiro, 1984),
whereas there is no logical reason why both sets (plus ‘full-time criminals’)
cannot be involved in frauds and money laundering.
Identity frauds and telemarketing scams
By contrast with notable criminal and ‘close to the wind’ entrepreneurs
operating under their own personal names discussed above (though some-
times using many corporate and trust vehicles), other frauds may depend on
false identities—wholly fictitious or ‘borrowed’ from real people—either for
their commission or for the laundering process. Thus a senior executive or
junior in the finance department might create a company or individual to
receive payments, otherwise resting on their ability to make transfers with-
out question: how elaborate the rest of the process is depends on how anx-
ious they are to avoid suspicion and conviction. If the aim is to flee, then
they may need false identities and that would usually involve others who
can supply them consciously. If the aim is to stay and deceive, then it may
involve others able to create a smokescreen of activities.
People other than insiders selling financial products need to find targets
to approach and develop persuasive methods of getting them to part with
funds. One way of doing so is to pretend to be someone else who is credit-
worthy. In the past, a simple method was to steal someone’s credit card and
(in the absence of photos on cards) look sufficiently plausible that a nor-
mally ill-motivated (in)capable guardian (in routine activities terminology)
such as a shop assistant would sell goods to them or—a stiffer but still pos-
sible test—give them money at a bank counter. When Chip and PIN was
introduced, this became much harder in the UK and in some terminals over-
seas, and the locus of fraud shifted to technological efforts to capture both,
or to the use of cards and duplicate cards abroad, with UK-issued card
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losses overseas doubling between 2006 and 2007, after remaining fairly
stable or falling over the previous six years.15 Chip and PIN necessitated a
change in the organization of fraud to greater internationalization of con-
spirators: electronic details copied from cards (a particular speciality of Sri
Lankans working in UK petrol stations) could be sent to confederates
abroad.16 Though this had happened before, it accelerated as a result of the
improvement of protection against fraud on lost and stolen cards (Levi,
2008b). Likewise, the cruder forms of bankruptcy fraud in which new com-
panies were created by people using false names and paid for the first few
orders before accelerating credit massively, selling the goods off and disap-
pearing, were frustrated by enhancements in commercial credit control and
pattern analysis, necessitating either wider transnational frauds or ‘less
organized’ frauds in the sense of fewer scammers operating in tandem (Levi,
2008a). A key point here is the interaction between changes in the technol-
ogy and organization of crime prevention and changes in the levels and
organization of fraud. (See McIntosh, 1971; for an influential early exercise
along these lines.) Alternatively, ‘identity thieves’ can try to bypass the con-
trol systems by applying for new credit facilities in the names of their vic-
tims, using a variety of techniques to get around the change of address
(easier in highly mobile societies like the US) or even diverting the victim’s
mail to their own address for a period. (See Copes and Vieraitis, 2007, 2008
for an interesting research study of identity theft: a more heterogeneous
term than the phrase might suggest.)
Much of the ‘criminal (auto)biography’ literature is devoted to individual
con artists whose lives—though highly entertaining (if one is not a victim)
and glamorous (if one is wedded, as they mostly are, to the culture of
consumption)—are not embedded in crime networks to any significant extent
(see e.g. Forsyth and Castro, 2007; Redding and Abagnale, 2003). The seem-
ingly endless biographies and ghosted autobiographies of the Kray brothers
and their entourage focus on the violence and extortion rather than the frauds
that helped sustain their London ‘empire’ in the 1960s. This applies also to
the Jake Arnott fictional trilogy, where even The Long Firm—which from the
title should be about bankruptcy frauds (Levi, 2008a)—is almost all about
sex and violence. The main fraud work that focuses us on networks is David
Maurer’s classic anthropological book The Big Con (2000, originally 1940).
There, the assistant grifters were drawn from the world of (white) profes-
sional thieves about whom Sutherland (1937) wrote, while the principals
were specialist confidence men. Maurer describes evocatively the way in
which the fraudsters set up their ‘marks’ (targets) in both short and long cons,
and the sometimes elaborate storefronts they used for their scams (as seen in
the movie The Sting, which was based on the book).
The contemporary equivalents of these are telemarketing fraudsters:
‘boiler room’ operators, who in one recent case (author interview with
police) worked in a room with a tape continuously playing in the back-
ground to simulate a busy stock brokerage; and the ‘419’ advance fee fraud-
sters who may hire or ‘borrow’ rooms when they know the legitimate users
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are away to use as props in their stings. In some investment scams involv-
ing wines and spirits, or ostriches, the operators do have some real prod-
ucts on show, but vastly fewer than those ‘purchased’ by the victims.
How do they find their targets? This can be through random dialling of
telephone directory entries; through share registers of public companies;
through perusal of advertisements in personal columns, articles about
wealthy people in the media; and through the use/purchase of existing
‘sucker lists’ (which, except for serial fraudsters reusing their old lists, is the
only method that would require contact with other offenders). Shover et al.
(2003) note that fraudulent firms employ sales agents who work from
‘lead’, or ‘mooch’, lists purchased from any of dozens of businesses that
compile and sell information on consumer behaviour and preferences. My
interviews with investigators in several countries (2008) suggest that
exchanges of ‘mooch lists’ are extensive and rapid—once someone has sub-
scribed to one lottery or other product by internet, post or telephone, they
soon experience allied scam ‘offers’ from other fraudsters, suggesting that
there is a sufficiently broad scope for fraudsters to be non-competitive.
Holtfreter et al. (2008) conducted an interesting study in Florida to exam-
ine whether low self-control was related to consumer fraud victimization.
They distinguished between the targeting and actual victimization of the
public and demonstrated that male consumers had a higher risk of being tar-
geted (as in a previous case study of Ponzi investment fraud by Trahan et al.,
2005), noting that since it is difficult for outsiders to judge whether people
they do not know will engage in risky behaviour, demographic correlates or
targeting are difficult to specify. They showed that fraud victimization was
not a random event because, although the net may be cast at random, the
financial behaviour of consumers was key. Traditional indicators of victim-
ization such as going to bars at night were unrelated to fraud targeting and
fraud victimization risk. So reducing financial risk-taking specifically might
reduce the extent to which people with low self-control might become vic-
tims of fraud, though it would not have an impact on other forms of vic-
timization risk. They conclude (2005: 209) that:
Perpetrators choose potential victims based on obvious indicators of vulner-
ability …. Financial risk-taking … is not an easily recognizable manifestation
of low self-control that fraudsters can observe and use to target potential vic-
tims. On the other hand, the routine activities of consumers such as remote
purchasing methods, are detected more easily by perpetrators of fraud.
This leads to targeting of people irrespective of their levels of self-control.
How are telemarketing fraudsters organized? Some fraudulent telemar-
keting organizations consist of two or three persons who operate in a com-
munity for only a few days or weeks before moving on. These ‘rip and tear’
operators depend on the months-long lapse between the time they begin
operating and the time law enforcement and consumer protection agencies
become aware of and target them. Somewhat larger ‘boiler rooms’ feature
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extensive telephone banks and large numbers of sales agents. Larger
telemarketing operations commonly take on the characteristics of formal
organizations, with hierarchies, a division of labour, graduated pay and
advancement opportunities. Those who are ill-suited to cold call selling or
who develop moral qualms simply leave the business.
In terms of ‘scripts’, if they wanted to commit a ‘boiler room’ fraud with-
out being licensed, then all they would need is an office, a good telephone
system and salespeople willing and able to persuade ‘punters’ to buy shares
for more than they were worth. Unlike the cons described by Maurer—
which are pure artifices and therefore must hire willing conspirators—the
investment scams can hire junior personnel through advertisements and
agencies who may be quite ignorant of the true rationale of the business.
Only the originators may be active criminals. Some telephone salespeople
may be experienced multi-scam participants (Stevenson, 1998; Shover et al.,
2003, 2004), but others may simply have the (wilful or not) ethical blind-
ness of commission-based income-generators: the sort of people responsible
not just for telemarketing frauds but for financial services industry ‘mis-
selling’ when working for major banks and insurance firms, leading to pay-
ments of hundreds of millions of pounds in compensation by the
companies.17 Some of those interviewed by Shover et al. (2003) had previ-
ous sales experience before beginning the work, but most did not: they either
responded to ads in the newspaper or were recruited by acquaintances who
boasted about the money they were making. Many were not succeeding at
conventional careers, and telemarketing came along at a time when they
needed to show that they could make something of themselves. They
believed they were outstanding salespersons, who could sell over the tele-
phone despite resistance from those they contacted; and they got a ‘high’
from doing so (see Katz, 1990; and Levi, 2008a for the emotional rewards
from crime commission). These salespeople are unlikely to come from the
‘general criminal classes’ but rather from people with persuasive skills (some
of whom may be ‘shaken out’ from financial services firms in recession),
recruited by advertisement and via agencies, and incentivized by high com-
mission and low basic pay. Such generic persuasion techniques are discussed
by Cialdini (2007).
Shover et al. (2003) state that the sales agent generally works from a
script that lays out successful sales approaches and responses. Promising
contacts are turned over to a ‘closer’, a more experienced and better-paid
sales agent. The hierarchy of the firms and the routine of turning prospects
over to more experienced closers explain why victims typically report con-
tact with multiple salespersons.
What factors influence the choice of venue for boiler rooms and their
modus operandi? From UK cases examined, boiler rooms are commonly
based abroad (e.g. in Spain, where police interest is low), never seek author-
ization by the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—which is a legal require-
ment to sell securities in the UK—and use high pressure sales and telephone
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techniques (author interviews with UK officials and police). One more
sophisticated technique is to approach a small UK company not listed on
the Stock Exchange and propose to raise capital by selling £100,000 worth
of shares in that company on their behalf. Of this £100,000, the boiler
room would agree to take 60 per cent as its fee, leaving the small company
with £40,000 capital. In reality, the boiler room will ‘cold call’ UK investors
to sell the shares at up to 100 per cent over the agreed price, take their fee
and vanish. The small companies involved may become liable to refund
investors the full price paid for their shares. There are several variations on
the method of committing the crime:
• complete con, where there are no shares in existence;
• different instruments used—stock, currency options (and even bull sperm);
• restricted (e.g. US ‘Regulation S’), worthless or over-priced shares;
• purported involvement in raising capital for companies;
• market manipulation where there are shares in existence and a (limited)
market;
• deceptive share promotion via bulletin boards.
If the fraudsters have sufficient nerve, they can seek to become regulated
in one EU country and obtain a ‘passport’ to operate in another under EU
single market regulations, using that as a base for fraud and making it dif-
ficult for local regulators to intervene to close them down. In all of these
cases, what the boiler room is really selling is deceptive and worthless
expectations.
The growth in cross-border consumer fraud operations can be illustrated
by data from the US. (No equivalent data are yet available for the UK.)
During the calendar year 2007, the US multi-agency Consumer Sentinel
(which acts as a one-stop shop for complaints) received over 835,000
complaints—258,000 identity theft and 577,000 fraud-related complaints:
the latter rose from 428,000 in 2006. Fifteen percent of the fraud-related
complaints were cross-border fraud-related, down as a percentage (rather
than as a number) from 23 per cent in 2006, reflecting the growth in fraud
complaints rather than the number of cross-border cases.18
Foreign Money Offers was the leading product/service category in US con-
sumers’ cross-border complaints (12%), followed by Prizes/Sweepstakes/Gifts
(11%), Shop-at-Home/Catalogue Sales (8%), Lotteries/Lottery Ticket Buying
Clubs (7%), and Internet Auction (5%). Internet-related complaints com-
prised 59 per cent (50,907) of the total cross-border fraud complaints
(86,074) received during calendar year 2007. To give some idea of the distri-
bution of complaints (which includes reports from Australian, British and
Canadian authorities), table 2 below tracks changes over time (Federal Trade
Commission, 2008):
Although complaints about overseas businesses may not reflect nation-
ality of the perpetrators, it may also illuminate to consider the amounts of
money at stake ($194 million—around £100 million in 2007) see table 3,
Criminology & Criminal Justice 8(4)406
 at Cardiff University on April 2, 2013crj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
from which should be deducted business costs to fraudsters. These may be
fairly modest, even assuming they pay for their communications.
In a longer work it would be possible to draw parallels, in terms of the
dynamics between setting and criminal act, in relation to a broader range
of identity and other frauds: for example, application frauds and insurance
frauds. If we take mortgage frauds, for example, fraud typically takes two
forms: customers lying about their own means—i.e., exaggerating their
income—and/or falsifying documents, such as creating fake payslips that
show they earn an amount large enough to justify the mortgage they need,
even if it is a multiple of their real income. This can be done simply by print-
ing fake payslips, if necessary on a colour printer. Self-certificated mort-
gages (at higher interest rates) were allowed to cater for the increasing
number of self-employed persons who could not produce genuine pay slips.
(They might also include their ‘off the books’ income!) One incentive for
mortgage introducers is that they are paid commission; one incentive for
lenders is that they have sales targets to hit and performance bonuses to get,
and non-payment usually comes much later. In some cases, the borrower is
told there is no way they are going to get the mortgage they want with their
income, and that they should leave that part of the mortgage application
form blank. After they have gone, the broker inserts the false income. In the
US particularly, there have been widespread scandals relating to commis-
sion-hungry brokers lying to purchasers about the affordability of mort-
gages, which they discover only when the initial low rates expire. In other
cases, the would-be purchaser colludes with the broker. In other cases still,
the broker (or lawyer) purchases the properties for themselves as beneficial
owner, using the names and real or fictitious income details of clients. In a
rising market, where there is demand (for example from students) for rental
properties, fraudulent purchasers see little downside risk. In some cases,
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Table 2. Cross-border fraud complaints by consumer and company locationa (calendar years
2005–2007)
CY US consumers US consumers Canadian Canadian Foreign 
against against consumers consumers consumers 
companies companies against against against 
located in located in companies companies companies 
Canada (%) other foreign located in located in located in 
countries (%) the US (%) other foreign the US or 
countries (%) Canada (%)
2005 21 64 5 4 6
2006 26 59 5 4 6
2007 21 62 6 5 6
Note: aPercentages are based on the total number of cross-border fraud complaints for each
calendar year: CY-2005  87,193; CY-2006  97,034 and CY-2007  86,074.
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valuers from a restricted panel are aware that the lenders need to lend and
their judgment is swayed by this to give the valuation required to enable the
mortgage to be granted: this is especially so where all the parties’ desires are
in the same direction (author interviews with surveyors, 1980s and 2008).
However when the market turns, as it did in 2007 (and earlier in the US),
these frauds are shaken out as people cannot keep up with repayments.
Ethnicity, nationality and the supply of offenders
The conventional way in which Organised Crime Situation Reports or their
recent variant threat assessments have worked (see Edwards and Levi, this
volume) has been to identify national or ethnic groups involved in serious
crimes for gain. To some extent those chosen for this association reflect
those groups law enforcement and intelligence agencies have access to, and
are self-justifying in ‘intelligence-led policing’.19 Many national and reli-
gious groups have occupied places in the demonology of crime, but in the
particular case of fraud, the two most common demons are Jews and
Nigerians. Ichheiser (1944), reviewing the social psychology of anti-
Semitism, argued that
‘Gangsters’ and ‘swindlers’ may be considered … as two personified symbols
of … fundamental forms of danger in social life …. Especially, in times like
our own, characterized by deep economic insecurities, ideological confusion,
fluidity and impenetrability of intricate social processes, by propaganda,
advertising, adulteration of goods, the man in the street feels himself far
more deeply threatened by those rather ‘invisible’ social dangers than by
overt coercion and violence. And he is getting more and more suspicious that
those invisible processes by which he is threatened are intentionally, and for
someone’s advantage, manipulated by some kind of swindlers ‘behind the
scenes.’ Consequently the swindler … becomes the main symbol of the pre-
dominant fear.
There is no need here to review the history of imagery that associated Jews
with swindling, but it remains a much more restrained sub-text in the post-
Hitler period, which understandably generates caution in its treatment in
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Table 3. Fraud complaints and amount paid by US consumers against companies located in
other foreign countries (calendar years 2005–2007)
CY Total Complaints Percentage Amount Average Median 
no. of reporting of complaints paid amount amount 
complaints amount reporting reported paid paid
paid amount paid
2005 55,474 28,729 52 US$136,649,579 US$4757 US$1304
2006 57,644 50,471 88 US$142,457,801 US$2823 US$1050
2007 53,629 47,388 88 US$194,032,819 US$4095 US$750
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criminological and media circles. I have made a decision here to include this
aspect of ‘the supply of fraudsters’ to fraud networks because it is a popu-
lar financial services industry and law enforcement theme. Analysis of pros-
ecution cases cannot but reflect any criteria that underlie the reporting,
investigation and prosecution processes, and so factors in the above that
protect social elites (such as those involved in Enron or in price-fixing car-
tels) might lead to their under-representation compared with social out-
siders. Likewise, negative social stereotypes (for example about who
‘dangerous criminals’ are) that affected these processes will lead to over-
representation.
The analysis of white-collar offenders in the US Federal courts by
Weisburd et al. (1991)—using data largely drawn from the 1970s—showed
that two thirds had no previous convictions but of those who had, only one
in five had previously been convicted of white-collar crime. The ethnicity of
offenders varies by offence type: anti-trust and securities offenders were 99
per cent white; but around a quarter of credit card fraud, mail fraud and
bank embezzlers were non-white. Jews were significantly over-represented
among securities offenders (though not compared with their numbers in the
general securities industry); but not among other white-collar offences.
Although the research on this issue has not been intensive, by inspection
similar remarks might be made about the UK in the initial years of the
Serious Fraud Office, but not subsequently. Thus all four convicted (but
none of those acquitted) in the Guinness case (Levi, 1991) were Jewish in
origin (though CEO Ernest Saunders had converted to Christianity).
However overall, neither Jews nor Asians nor any other religious, ethnic or
national group are significantly over-represented in UK SFO cases, taking
account of their numbers in the corporate and financial services industries.
Of course one needs no ‘racial’ theories about these connections, for they
are often relationships of propinquity and mutual trust. By volume, most
fraudsters are blue-collar rather than white-collar in background (Weisburd
et al., 2001; Piquero and Benson, 2004), and some sub-sets of American
offenders (for example ‘identity fraudsters’) are disproportionately black or
Hispanic (Copes and Vieraitis, 2007). This merely reflects the fact that
some types of fraud can be accomplished by ‘ordinary’ offenders, and there
is a ready supply of willing offenders from poorer communities who would
commit fraud if they had the technical and social skills required and the
confidence to engage in such crimes. Whether many such persons would
have the verbal skills to commit securities frauds—even ‘boiler room’ and
suchlike that do not require formal qualifications—is more doubtful, but
payment card and social security frauds are relatively low-skilled.
Discussions about ‘fraud’ with bankers in many parts of the world
immediately throw up the word ‘Nigerians’ (author interviews; see also
Peel, 2006 and Glenny, 2008). As with many areas of ‘organized crime’,
international Diasporas have become a common focus of risk discourses,
and Nigerians represent a nationality whose Diasporas—whether in Nigeria
itself or in Australia, Ghana, Ireland, the Netherlands, North America,
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Russia, South Africa or the UK (to mention only some countries where
Nigerian fraud networks have been observed)—are more visibly active than
most in the sphere of fraud. See also Aning, 2007; Smith, 2007 and United
Nations, 2005. Peel (2006) has demonstrated that some areas and tribes are
more likely than others to be involved in such frauds, and they tend to be
loose confederations rather than a tight hierarchy of offenders. He notes (pp.
22–23) that fraudsters buy respectability and even adoration if they chan-
nel some of their money back to their impoverished home towns. As
Mertonian strain theory might lead us to expect, locals recognize what they
have gained while displaying little interest in how they have obtained it. The
explanations for heavy involvement in financial crime of Igbo people from
the country’s east include
(1) The social and economic marginalization (and exclusion from government
patronage) both before the 1967–70 civil war and since.
(2) Policing is particularly poor there and in Lagos and Delta state, which are
also rich sources of financial crime.
(3) The east has the kind of entrepreneurial commercial centres around which
this type of crime will tend to be found. In Northern Nigeria, by contrast,
there is a much smaller private sector and more government-based corrup-
tion. In Yorubaland in the west, scams are often linked directly to the
accounting, banking and legal professions, which traditionally attract
many Yoruba.
One might add that from the point of view of the Nigerian people them-
selves, these 419 frauds are far less harmful than the networks of corruption
and patronage among military and civilian leaders who—especially but far
from exclusively under military dictatorships—have stolen billions of dollars of
income from the Nigerian oil production and from contracts, and who have
converted these funds for their own use: the so-called ‘curse of oil’. Between the
British police and the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crime Commission
during the time of President Obasanjo,20 four Nigerian state governors were
charged with money laundering and/or fraud. But the 419s and other ‘advance
fee’ scams—called because people, once hooked, usually become trapped into
paying fees to advance the payment of ‘their’ money—are the ‘outward-facing’
side of Nigerian fraud and involve losses to Westerners.
More generally in cybercrimes for gain (including payment card fraud),
though there are plenty of indigenous fraudsters in the UK and the US,
Eastern Europeans have developed a reputation for technical skill and
cross-border operations. There is nothing exclusive about these national-
ities, but in identified American and British cases (which are only partly the
product of what law enforcement choose to pursue), Lithuanians,
Rumanians and Russians predominate in such forms of fraud, though
Brazilians are playing an increasing role. Rumanians also have played a
significant role in the use in the UK of technical devices on ATMs (such as
the Lebanese Loop—first developed by Lebanese crime groups and now in
decline due to technical prevention improvements) to capture payment card
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PINs. However it is less obvious what the analytical value is of such ethnic
and national identifiers, which unintentionally scapegoat large classes of
individuals who may be largely innocent of involvement in crime.
Trahan et al. (2005) link fraud victim behaviour to ‘the American
dream’, applying interestingly the more general criminological analysis of
Messner and Rosenfeld (2001). Yet it is not obvious how specific to
America this dream (or nightmare) is. Where people have some IT educa-
tion and intelligence but few legitimate opportunities in their home areas,
they often seek opportunities elsewhere. Especially given legal migration
and employment controls (supplemented perhaps by discrimination)—or
fewer good jobs available for anyone in their place of emigration than they
expected—they may be tempted by offers from others seeking co-offenders
or they may develop their own fraud schemes. This was what drove the emi-
gration of (non-Jewish) Germans to London in the mid-19th century,
whereupon some of them turned to bankruptcy fraud, often against
German companies (Levi, 2008a). Thus it is unsurprising that irrespective
of any prejudices among social control agencies, we get clusters of offenders
with similar backgrounds: colour, language (which also shelters from
surveillance), and geography (people sharing ethnicities, nationality and
religion often live close to each other) all contribute.
Conclusion
Globalization of crime is part of contingent relationships between settings,
with their rich and varied opportunities (reflecting patterns of business,
consumer and investment activities), the abilities of would-be perpetrators
to recognize and act on those opportunities (the ‘crime scripts’ perspective),
and their interactions with controls, including law enforcement (touched
only lightly upon here). Constructs of ‘organized crime’ should be (and are
becoming) less obsessed with the structure of groups than with what 
people need from the largely illicit and largely licit worlds to go about the
business of fraud. In other words, analysis of ‘organized-ness’ is becoming
decentred and re-understood as much in terms of the settings in which
offending and its precursors can take place as in terms of the acts
themselves.
Such observations or claims about the contested and shifting nature of
analysis over time complicate the already difficult question of whether
fraud ‘itself’ has changed over the years. It seems reasonable to reflect on
two ‘historical’ questions:
(1) In what respects has fraudulent activity changed, in terms of the sorts of
techniques and organization that are or can be used, in relation to the
efforts made (intentionally or not) to prevent frauds? And
(2) In what respects has the world of fraud changed and what would the sort
of people with the sort of skill sets/networks who committed frauds in the
1960s and 1970s have contemplated doing today?
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In relation to the first question, although the basic techniques used by
fraudsters in the 1960s are still available today, especially against those
investors and trade creditors who make only modest enquiries, the profes-
sionalization of investor protection and credit management in the UK, as
well as consumer media interest, makes the commission of such frauds
harder. E-commerce, the growth of lightweight, high value electronic prod-
ucts, and the technology of rapid delivery anywhere in the world have cut
down decision times and opened up domestic and foreign markets to fraud-
sters within and outside the UK. At the high end of insolvency frauds, it
seems doubtful whether the more skilful abuses of insolvency by those who,
for example, establish beneficially owned corporate fronts offshore and
then create artificial debts to them which enable them to vote in friendly
liquidators or administrators, are any harder to commit or are any more likely
to be punished today than they were 30 years ago. Formal social control—
the police and criminal courts—has not been particularly interested in
frauds other than the more visibly harmful ‘widows and orphans’ cases.
There has been a growth in ‘civil recovery’ regimes, applying financial
investigation and asset forfeiture (irrespective of criminal conviction) to
supplement the post-conviction confiscation remedies that have replaced
the Criminal Bankruptcy Orders. However even if they have substantial
confiscatable savings rather than (as did the high-spending long-firm fraud-
sters interviewed by Levi, 2008 and the telemarketers interviewed by
Shover et al., 2003, for example) spending ‘their’ proceeds as they went
along, few fraudsters are high profile career criminals of a seriousness level
that would interest the Serious and Organised Crime Agency. This question
is connected to the second.
What forms of fraud constitute a ‘rational choice’ depends on the confi-
dence, skills and contact set of any given individual offenders. The presence
or absence of ‘crime networks’ known to and trusted by the willing offender
makes a difference to ‘crime capacitation’: an issue often neglected in indi-
vidualized explanations of involvement in crime. Choice of crime type
might also be affected by age. Those offenders who were in their 50s and
over might not be attracted towards the technological challenges of cyber-
activities, and—except via close encounters on porn sites, in night clubs, or
in prisons—the age gap might apply to co-criminality as it does to other
features of contemporary life. So today’s new generation fraudsters might
gravitate towards more ‘techie’ forms of fraud, whereas if they were in late
career, it might seem too risky to adapt in unfamiliar territory unless they
could find someone younger to collaborate with. This is a general propos-
ition about the relationship between age and risk-taking/innovation. Some
fraudsters display a remarkable aptitude for creativity and constant testing
out of commercial systems and private individuals for signs of weakness.
This focus on ‘criminal transferable skills’—the set of aptitudes including
social networking individual/sets of offenders have—concentrates our
attention on offender creativity, energy and social networking skills in find-
ing co-offenders (or ‘turning’ non-offenders into co-offenders) and in
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adapting techniques: many offenders (and non-offenders) lack one or all of
these qualities.
Objectively, there are far more opportunities for disintermediated crime
in late modernity than in the post-war decades. With only modest sophisti-
cation, the internet and social constructions of what is normal have made
it easier for foreign natural and legal persons to defraud consumers and
suppliers, for example via counterfeited or cloned payment cards.
Fraudsters could be involved in the theft of personal data from garbage
(‘bin raiding’) or by hacking into data storage facilities; or account manipu-
lation by insiders, whether in call centres or elsewhere. (The offshoring of
call centres led to periodic media alarm stories about blackmail and cor-
ruption in India: but it is nonsensical to think that this cannot happen in the
UK, with badly paid staff and high turnover ratios. Indeed, there may be
tougher regimes in Indian call centres—staff searches and prohibitions on
mobile phones in the premises—than might be allowed in the UK.) Rings of
staged accidents with claims for hard-to-falsify personal injuries would be
within the skill set of some (once they worked out what to do), as would
organized benefit fraud and—especially—the sale of counterfeit products,
whose quality digital technology has done so much to improve, despite the
best efforts of the anti-counterfeiting coalitions. For the more adventurous,
scams can involve some currently fashionable musical or sporting events, or
a social cause such as ‘renewable energy’. One may expect some future
scams involving carbon trading. The underlying concepts were available to
investors at the time of the South Sea Bubble, but some investors in each
subsequent generation and/or country have to learn the lessons for them-
selves. Arguably, as evidenced by declining savings ratios and the willing-
ness to borrow against the legal security of homes in the UK and elsewhere,
there has been a step change in people’s expectations of steady state or ris-
ing affluence, and resistance to personal financial decline. When times get
hard as they have done in the period 2007-09, people may take more risks
to avoid downward socio-economic mobility, and this offers opportunities
to fraudsters. At a policy level, this means that a focus on ‘regulating’ rather
than ‘eliminating’ frauds is sensible: what constitutes an acceptable level of
fraud may depend on who the victims are, how much they can afford to
lose, and the collateral damage caused.
Notes
1 Professor of Criminology, Cardiff University. Contact details Levi@
Cardiff.ac.uk. The author is grateful for the ESRC Professorial Fellowship
RES-051–27–0208, under whose auspices this research was conducted. 
I also thank Nicholas Dorn for comments on an earlier version of this
article.
2 Though one would not overstate the strength in depth of quality research
on the organization of any crimes.
Levi––Organized fraud and organizing frauds 413
 at Cardiff University on April 2, 2013crj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
3 This is a technical neologism rather than the common language sense of
‘script’.
4 There is an ongoing debate, which we bypass here, about terminology in
the white-collar and corporate crime arenas (see e.g. Levi, 2008a).
Financial crime (more commonly ‘economic crime’ in Europe) is a term
broader than fraud, which also includes corruption and money-laundering.
5 Consider this in relation to the UK and the European National Intelligence
Model, in which Level 1 refers to crimes within a police force area; Level
2 to crimes within the UK but involving more than one force area; and level
3 refers to international crimes. Does the mere fact that money is trans-
ferred overseas or credit cards are used fraudulently overseas make them
level 3 crimes?
6 In some cases, they may encounter people (or companies) they consider to
be potential suckers and then develop ways of fleecing them. There is a
flexibility here that is poorly captured in the term ‘organized crime’.
7 Rather than ‘suspicious activities’ or ‘suspicious transactions’, as is the offi-
cial terminology, I consider it more analytically accurate to term them sus-
pected transactions. Electronic transfers create a clearer audit trail if and
when identified and followed than do cash movements.
8 I interviewed one offender who would have had difficulty in disposing of a
truckload of yoghurt, had he not been arrested before he dealt with the
dilemma. One 19th century fraudster obtained from Germany a gross (144)
of artificial glass eyes which he was unable to sell and in the end, he had to
dispose of for the price of the postage it cost to obtain them (Levi, 2008a).
9 The sanctions would have to be significant in terms of their own values in
the ‘communities’ (if any) they inhabit. Cultural variations in legitimacy
can be quite broad.
10 This echoes other practical failures in the fraud attempts of others, like taking
too long a lunch break and therefore not being in the office when the bank
rang to verify that the £25 million transfer request to a new account was
intentional. These also give willing future offenders some useful tips to avoid!
11 Unless the purchases on ‘borrowed’ card data are picked up by the sophis-
ticated electronic systems that model customer transaction patterns and
contact customers proactively if there are transactions that do not fit their
profiles.
12 The longer and more intensive an investigation, the more likely it is that
surveillance will generate an accurate model of interactions between play-
ers in the network. Morselli and Roy correctly argue that when combined
with an understanding of the roles that are hard to substitute, Social
Network Analysis gives a better idea of the impact of enforcement inter-
ventions against central players. Sometimes one only learns impact after the
operation/arrests, and in my view, one key question is whether in practice
investigations do continue to test the disruptive effects: this might be hard
to justify both legally (in terms of criteria for surveillance authorization)
and financially (given severe constraints on police finances – someone has
to be paid to listen, and this is especially expensive in foreign languages).
Boundary assessments for determining the limits of social networks may be
harder in fraud than in some other networks.
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13 Though in some European countries, for example, people with criminal
records are not allowed to become company directors.
14 This is not a recent issue. Lefkowitz (1963: 51) notes: ‘In recent years, per-
sons with criminal records have attempted by various guises to infiltrate the
securities market, posing major problems for governmental regulatory
agencies in the securities field. New York State has attempted by statute to
eliminate persons with felony convictions from engaging in the securities
business. Another problem in New York was high-pressure “boiler room”
operations. A New York statute now requires registration of securities
salesmen, in an effort to alleviate that problem. The gangster element has
found it increasingly difficult to conduct business in New York under these
enactments.’
15 Between 2000 and 2007, ‘card not present’ losses on UK-issued cards rose
from £72.9 million to £290.5 million. In 2007, there were over 2 million
‘card not present’ frauds in England and Wales, a rise of 58 per cent by vol-
ume. However while the frauds of this kind quadrupled 2000–2007, online
shopping increased tenfold to £34 billion. So the rise in fraud was modest
compared with the growth in this form of consumer behaviour.
16 Hence some connection between payment card fraud and the financing of
the Tamil Tigers (LTTE): but what proportion even of Sri Lankan card
fraud went to finance terrorism rather than to sustain impoverished people
or make some foreigners wealthy remains unknown—another example
of the loose conceptualization of the link between organized crime and
terrorism.
17 The distinction between mis-selling and fraud can be a fine one at times. The
UK Financial Services Authority has set out criteria for judging mis-selling
(http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2003/052.shtml),
stating ‘it is the suitability of the recommendation for the consumer, not the
investment performance of the product that matters. As long as suitability
was established at the time of sale, and the required explanation of risk
made, then consumer dissatisfaction about investment returns achieved
gives no basis for an allegation of mis-selling. Investment performance may
be relevant in assessing redress due where mis-selling is shown to have
occurred.’
18 A fraud complaint is ‘cross-border’ if: (1) a US consumer complained about
a company located in Canada or another foreign country; (2) a Canadian
consumer complained about a company located in the US or another for-
eign country; or (3) a consumer from a foreign country (e.g. the UK or
Australia) complained about a company located in the US or Canada.
Company location is based on addresses reported by the complaining
consumers and, thus, likely understates the number of cross-border com-
plaints. In some instances the company address provided by the consumer
actually may be a mail drop in the consumer’s country rather than the
physical location of the company in a foreign country, and in other cases,
the consumer does not know whether the location is in the US or abroad.
19 ‘There is a well-justified fear that raids [by the UK Borders and
Immigration Agency] have focused on ethnic minority businesses. The list
provided on the Home Office website shows that 95% of those targeted
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have been Indian, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Vietnamese and Turkish-run.’ Such
businesses are the easiest ‘low hanging fruit’ to fulfil organizational targets,
compared with other workers in the hotel and food picking/production trades.
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/16/humanrights.immi
grationpolicy.)
20 After Obasanjo’s departure from office, the head and then the acting head
of the EFCC were replaced in 2008, suggesting to some the view of the new
regime that they had become over-active in combating elites. Action against
419 fraudsters was more acceptable, since these were not usually connected
to government elites (interviews with police and other officials, 2008).
Despite the reputational damage 419 frauds and governmental corruption
were causing to Nigeria, it seems unlikely that much of this policing activ-
ity in Nigeria would have taken place had the country not been ‘black-
listed’ by the Financial Action Task Force for inadequate anti-money
laundering processes.
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